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ARTICLES

SURVEYING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE FOR PENNSYLVANIA
SAME-SEX COUPLES
Anthony C. Infanti"

INTRODUCTION

By spring 2009, a quick succession of advances in the battle over samesex marriage in Connecticut, California, Iowa, Maine, New Hampshire, and
Vermont had led some commentators to describe the moment using such
hyperbolic phrases as "tipping point" and "potential watershed."' The legal
and legislative wins in these states-however tentative-had created a sense
of momentum in favor of lesbian and gay rights advocates in the battle over
same-sex marriage.2 Yet jubilation over a string of victories should not

*

Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. This paper updates and expands upon

Maureen B. Cohon, Where the Rainbow Ends: Trying to Find a Pot of Goldfor Same-Sex Couples in
Pennsylvania,41 DUQ. L. REv. 495 (2003). Thanks go to Maureen for suggesting that the time had come
for someone to update her work.
1. Editorial, Equality'sAdvance, COURIER-JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), May 10, 2009, at 2H (using
"tipping point"); Abby Goudnough, Rejecting Veto, Vermont Backs Same-Sex Marriage,N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 8, 2009, at Al (indicating that opponents of same-sex marriage recognize this as a "potential
watershed moment"). In each of the states mentioned in the text above, the right to marry was extended to
same-sex couples either through court decision or legislative action. Act of May 6, 2009, 2009 Me. Adv.
Legis. Serv. 82 (LexisNexis); Act of June 3, 2009, 2009 NH Adv. Legis. Serv. 59 (LexisNexis); Act of
Apr. 7, 2009,2009 Vt. Adv. Legis. Serv. 3 (LexisNexis); In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008);
Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa
2009). For later developments in California and Maine, see infra note 2.
2.
See Editorial, RethinkingMarriage,BALTIMORE SUN, May 10, 2009, at 24A ("the momentum
for change in marriage laws is building"). The May 2008 court victory in California that extended the right
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obscure the larger perspective on this battle. We should not lose sight of the
fact that in each of these jurisdictions, with the exception of Iowa, same-sex
couples could obtain legal recognition for their relationships by entering into
a domestic partnership or a civil union even before these latest legislative
struggles. In other words, couples in all of these states (except Iowa) were not
fighting to obtain legal recognition for their relationships, but rather to
extricate themselves from a second-class status by obtaining access to
marriage.
Important as such battles are, it should not be forgotten that most states
still do not legally recognize same-sex relationships at all. Indeed, at the time
of the 2000 census, only about 35% of all same-sex partner households in the
United States resided in jurisdictions that currently (or soon will) provide
some measure of formal legal recognition to same-sex relationships, whether
that recognition comes in the form of a marriage, civil union, domestic
partnership, or reciprocal or designated beneficiary relationship.' Conversely,

to marry to same-sex couples was quickly overturned at the ballot box the following November when
California voters passed Proposition 8. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7.5; Jesse McKinley& Laurie Goodstein, Bans
in 3 States on Gay Marriage,N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,2008, at Al. The California Supreme Court turned away
legal challenges to Proposition 8, but did leave intact the marriages of those same-sex couples who were
married in the short window between the court's earlier decision and the passage of Proposition 8. Strauss
v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). California recently enacted legislation that similarly recognizes out-ofstate same-sex marriages entered into prior to the passage of Proposition 8, and it affords same-sex couples
married out-of-state on or after the passage of Proposition 8 all of the rights and obligations of
marriage-though it does not accord them the legal status of "marriage." An Act to Amend Section 308 of
the Family Code, 2009 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 625 (S.B. 54) (West).
Opponents of same-sex marriage in Maine immediately filed the necessary paperwork to put that
state's new legislation extending the right to marry to same-sex couples before the voters in a "people's
referendum." Judy Harrison, Anti-Gay MarriageEffort Advances, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, May 20, 2009,
at Al. On November 3, 2009, voters in Maine repealed this legislation before it ever went into effect. Abby
Goodnough, Gay Rights Rebuke May Result in a Change in Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, at A25.
3.
See Tavia Simmons & Martin O'Connell, U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Special Reports:
Married-Couple and Unmarried-PartnerHouseholds: 2000, at 4 tbl.2 (2003), available at http://
www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf.
The jurisdictions that, as of this writing, afford some measure of legal recognition to same-sex
relationships are: California, Colorado, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, Vermont, Washington, and
Wisconsin. See generally CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 297, 297.5 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-A:1-6
(2009); MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 6-101 (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §37:1-31 (2009); Act ofMay 31,
2009, 2009 Nev. Adv. Legis. Serv. 393 (LexisNexis); Act of June 3, 2009, 2009 NH Adv. Legis. Serv. 59
(LexisNexis); Act of May 9, 2007, 2007 Ore. Adv. Legis. Serv. 99 (LexisNexis), as amended by Act of
June 25, 2009, 2009 Ore. HB 2389 (LexisNexis); Act of Apr. 7, 2009, 2009 Vt. Adv. Legis. Serv. 3
(LexisNexis); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d 407; Varnum, 763 N.W.2d 862; Opinions of the Justices to the Senate,
802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-57 (Mass.
2003); ANTHONY C. INFANTI, EVERYDAY LAW FOR GAYS AND LESBIANS (AND THOSE WHO CARE ABOUT
THEM) 145-46, 147, 151-52 (2007) (describing the limited legal recognition provided to same-sex couples
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this means that, at the 2000 census, about 65% of all same-sex partner
households resided in jurisdictions that did not then, and do not now, formally
legally recognize same-sex relationships.'
By way of illustration, I describe in this paper the legal obstacles and
uncertainties currently faced by same-sex couples in Pennsylvania, which is
both the state where I live and teach and one of the many states that do not
formally legally recognize same-sex relationships. Part I describes the (rather
small) extent to which same-sex relationships currently benefit from express
legal recognition in Pennsylvania. Part II describes the alternative means that
same-sex couples can employ to obtain a measure of legal and nonlegal
recognition for their relationships in Pennsylvania. Part HI covers issues
relating to the establishment and breakup of families. Finally, Part IV
describes a few miscellaneous, yet interesting recent cases relating to samesex couples in Pennsylvania.

in the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, and Washington); Ian Urbina, DistrictofColumbia BackSameSex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2009, at A28 (indicating that a law extending the right to marry to
same-sex couples is expected to take effect in spring 2010); Stacy Forster, Wisconsin is FirstState with
Same-Sex MarriageBan to Offer Domestic Partnerships,MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, July 2, 2009,
at B 1 (indicating that "same-sex couples would be offered 43 of the more than 200 rights and benefits
extended to married couples"); John Ingold, Legislature2009 Law EasesEstate Planningfor Unwed and
Gay Couples, DENVER POST, Apr. 10, 2009, at B I (describing a new law that "allows two people to enter
into 'designated beneficiary agreements' for estate planning, property purchases, medical decisions and
certain benefits such as life-insurance and retirement-plan disbursements"). For a discussion of recent
events in Maine, see supra note 2. In May 2009, Washington passed legislation affording registered
domestic partners all of the rights and obligations associated with marriage, and this legislation survived
a ballot referendum in November 2009. Ryan Blethen, Referendum 71 Shows Washington's Strategyfor
MarriageEquality Is Working, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 6, 2009, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource
.com/htmlopinion/ 2010219375_ryanO8.htm.
According to Simmons & O'Connell, supra,at 4 tbl.2, a total of210,347 same-sex unmarried partners
lived in these jurisdictions, out of a total of 594,391 same-sex unmarried partners in the United States.
4.
Moreover, these two groups of same-sex couples-that is, the "haves," who can seek formal
legal recognition of their relationships, and the "have-nots," who do not have that option in their home
states-are not as separate as they might seem. In reality, the legal fortunes of these two ostensibly separate
groups are closely intertwined, because the geographic boundaries that separate them are as porous as our
society is mobile. In other words, the haves can become have-nots (and the have-nots can become haves)
simply by crossing a state line, whether actually or virtually. As a result, from a legal planning perspective,
the haves must be just as concerned with the legal treatment of the have-nots as they are with their own
legal treatment under their own state's laws. The haves must, therefore, plan not only with their home state's
laws in mind, but must also keep in mind the possibility that their relationship may be relevant under the
law of a state that will not legally recognize their marriage, civil union, domestic partnership, or reciprocal
beneficiary relationship. See generally Anthony C. Infanti, Taxing Civil Rights Gains, _ MICH. J.
GENDER & L. _ (forthcoming 2010) (recharacterizing the costs that same-sex couples in legally
recognized relationships must incur to plan for the possibility that their relationship might be relevant under
another state's law as a tax on lesbian and gay families).
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I. RELATIONSHIP (NON)RECOGNITION IN PENNSYLVANIA
A. Marriage
In Pennsylvania, "marriage" is defined as "[a] civil contract by which one
man and one woman take each other for husband and wife."5 Pennsylvania is
thus among the forty-five states that do not currently (and will not soon) allow
same-sex couples to marry.6 Even before the end of common law marriage in
Pennsylvania, 7 the state's superior court held that same-sex couples could not
contract a valid common law marriage. 8
Pennsylvania is also among the forty-one states that, as of this writing,
expressly refuse to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated elsewhere.9 In
5. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (2008).
6. As of this writing, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont allow
same-sex couples to marry. See supra note 3.
7.
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1103 (2008).
8.
De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984).
9. Twelve states have a statutory prohibition against the recognition of same-sex marriages, three
states have a constitutional prohibition against the recognition of same-sex marriages, and twenty-six states
have both a statutory and a constitutional prohibition against the recognition of same-sex marriages.
INFANTI, supranote 3, at 157 tbl.6. 1.Since I compiled this table, the California Supreme Court struck down
that state's statutory prohibition against same-sex marriage, In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal.
2008), and California voters quickly replaced that statutory prohibition with a constitutional one (i.e.,
Proposition 8). CAL. CONST. art. IL§ 7.5; McKinley & Goodstein, supra note 2. As mentioned above, the
California Supreme Court turned away a constitutional challenge to Proposition 8, but held that same-sex
marriages celebrated in California prior to the passage of Proposition 8 must continue to be legally
recognized. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). In addition, in November 2008, both Florida and
Arizona added constitutional prohibitions against same-sex marriage to their existing statutory prohibitions.
McKinley& Goodstein, supranote 2. Furthermore, the Connecticut Supreme Court effectively struck down
that state's statutory prohibition against same-sex marriage when it extended the right to marry to same-sex
couples. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). The Iowa Supreme Court did
likewise when it extended the right to marry to same-sex couples. Vamum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa
2009). The legislatures of New Hampshire and Vermont eliminated their states' statutory prohibitions
against same-sex marriage when they approved legislation extending the right to marry to same-sex couples.
Act of June 3, 2009, 2009 NH Adv. Legis. Serv. 59 (LexisNexis); Act of Apr. 7, 2009, 2009 Vt. Adv. Legis.
Serv. 3 (LexisNexis).
The statutes of the District of Columbia, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, and Rhode Island do
not expressly prohibit same-sex marriages. INFANTI, supra note 3, at 157 tbl.6. 1. Nonetheless, the courts
of the District of Columbia, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island have interpreted their ambiguous
statutes to prohibit same-sex marriage. Id; Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007).
Yet, in July 2009, the District of Columbia began to recognize same-sex marriages celebrated in other
jurisdictions. D.C. Vote Puts Gay MarriageBefore Congress, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 9, 2009, at 2; Nikita
Stewart, How Gay MarriageRecognition Works, WASH. POST, July 7, 2009, at B2. And it is expected that
legislation permitting same-sex marriages to be celebrated in the District of Columbia itself will take effect
in spring 2010. See supra note 3. Despite a favorable opinion from the New York attorney general, that
state's courts have issued mixed decisions on the question of whether same-sex marriages, civil unions, and
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1996, the Pennsylvania General Assembly enacted its defense ofmarriage act,
which provides that "[a] marriage between persons of the same sex which was
entered into in another state or foreign jurisdiction, even if valid where
entered into, shall be void in this Commonwealth."'" In 2008, an attempt to
amend the Pennsylvania Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage-as well
as any same-sex union that is the functional equivalent of marriage-failed in
the state legislature." However, it would not be surprising to see this (or a
similar) proposal resurface in the future.

domestic partnerships celebrated in other states must be recognized in New York. CompareLewis v. N.Y.
Dep't of Civil Servs., 872 N.Y.S.2d 578 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (rejecting a challenge to the state's
extension of health insurance benefits to the spouses of lesbian and gay state employees who are parties to
a same-sex marriage entered into in another state); Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2008) (requiring recognition of a Canadian same-sex marriage), andC.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d
884 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008) (same), and Beth R. v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2008)
(same), with Matter of Langan v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 849 N.Y.S.2d 105 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007)
(refusing recognition to a Vermont civil union), and Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476
(N.Y. App. Div. 2005) (same), and Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006) (refusing
recognition to a Canadian same-sex marriage), and Funderburke v. N.Y. State Dep't of Civil Serv., 822
N.Y.S.2d 393 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006), vacated by 854 N.Y.S.2d 466 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (same), andWill
of Alan Zwerling, 240 N.Y.L.J. 49 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 2008) (recognizing a Canadian same-sex marriage for
purposes of an intestacy proceeding, but joining the deceased's parents as parties to the proceeding-even
though they would not normally be so joined where there is a surviving spouse-because the state of the
law on recognizing out-of-state same-sex marriages in the Second Department of the Appellate Division
of the New York Supreme Court is unclear). The message from the New York courts has been sufficiently
muddled that the New York Court of Appeals, which is the state's highest court, granted leave to appeal
in two cases that concern the recognition of out-of-state same-sex marriages. Godfrey v. Spano, 906 N.E.2d
1085 (N.Y. 2009); Lewis v. N.Y. State Dep't of Civil Serv., 906 N.E.2d 1086 (N.Y. 2009). Nevertheless,
the court ultimately dodged the question of whether the State of New York must recognize same-sex
marriages celebrated in other jurisdictions, instead deciding the case on technical and procedural grounds.
Godffrey v. Spano, No. 147, 2009 N.Y. LEXIS 4050 (Nov. 19, 2009).
In 2008, the governor of New York issued an order directing state agencies to recognize same-sex
marriages celebrated in other jurisdictions; however, this order will have no effect on the (still) mixed
signals that have been sent by the state courts, and, even with respect to state agencies, its validity has been
cast in doubt by several state legislators and the Alliance Defense Fund, who have together filed a lawsuit
challenging the governor's actions on constitutional grounds. Jeremy W. Peters, New York to Back SameSex Unionsfrom Elsewhere,N.Y. TIMES, May 29,2008, at Al; Jeremy W. Peters, Suit Seeks to Block State
Policy on Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2008, at B3. The New York Supreme Court, which is a
trial-level court, dismissed this suit; however, the plaintiffs immediately indicated their intent to appeal this
ruling. Nicholas Confessore, Court Backs PatersonRegarding Gay Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2008, at
B5.
10. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1704 (2008). At the same time, the Pennsylvania legislature added the
definition of marriage quoted supra text accompanying note 5.
11. Timothy McNulty, Backers Try to Revive Ban on Same-Sex Marriage,PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, May 17, 2008, at B2.
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B. City Registries
Nevertheless, three Pennsylvania cities now have domestic partnership
registries: Philadelphia and Harrisburg have life partnership registries, and
Pittsburgh has a domestic partnership registry.' 2 In Pittsburgh and Harrisburg,
registration is open to both same-sex and different-sex unmarried couples. 3
In Philadelphia, only same-sex couples may register as life partners. 4
In all three cities, there are a series of requirements that must be satisfied
as a prerequisite to registration. 5 Though these requirements are loosely
patterned after those that apply to marriages in Pennsylvania, the requirements
to register a partnership go beyond what is required of different-sex couples
who wish to marry. In particular, domestic or life partners-but not differentsex couples who wish to marry-are required to affirm or demonstrate their
financial interdependence as a prerequisite to being eligible for registration. 6
The couple must also have been together for a minimum of six months prior
to registration in Philadelphia.' In Pittsburgh, city employees who wish to
have their partners covered under their fringe benefits packages must
demonstrate that they have been together for a minimum of one year. 8
Harrisburg does not impose a waiting period on registration. 9
At best, however, registration provides only limited benefits. In Pittsburgh
and Harrisburg, domestic partners and life partners have the same hospital
visitation rights as spouses.2 ° In Harrisburg, employees get the same
bereavement leave for the death of a life partner as for a spouse and, in
residential leases in that city, the word "family" is to be interpreted to include
life partners. 2' In Pittsburgh, life partners get the same access to city facilities

12. HARRISBURG, PA. CODE §4-201.1 (2009); PHILA., PA. CODE § 9-1106 (2008); PiTrSBURGH, PA.
CODE § 186.03 (2008); see City of Harrisburg, Life PartnershipRegistry Information Sheet, http://
harrisburgcitycouncil.com/InformationSheet.doc (last visited Nov. 5, 2009); Phila. Comm'n on Human
Relations, Life Partnership,http://www.phila.gov/humanrelations/pdfs/Documents.pdf (last visited Nov. 5,
2009).
13. HARRISBURG, PA. CODE § 4-201.1 (2009); PITTSBURGH, PA. CODE § 186.03 (2008).
14. PHILA., PA. CODE § 9-1106(2)(a) (2008).
15. Id.; HARRISBURG, PA. CODE § 4-201.3 (2009); PrrTSBURGH, PA. CODE § 186.04-.05 (2008).
16. HARRISBURG, PA. CODE § 4-201.3(E) (2009); PHILA., PA. CODE § 9-1106(2)(a)(v)-(vi) (2008);
PITSBURGH, PA. CODE § 186.05 (2008).
17. PHILA., PA. CODE § 9-1106(2)(b) (2008).
18. PrrrsBURGH, PA. CODE § 186.02(a)(5) (2008).
19. HARRISBURG, PA. CODE § 4-201.3 (2009).
20. Id. § 4-205.1; PrFrsBURGH, PA. CODE § 186.08(2) (2008).
21. HARRISBURG, PA. CODE § 4-205.3-.4 (2009).
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as spouses.22 And, in all three cities, registration can be used as evidence of
commitmentto gain access to public- orprivate-employer-provided benefits.2 3
In Philadelphia, a life partnership can be terminated simply by filing a
termination statement, which will be effective 60 days from the date of
filing.2 4 In Pittsburgh and Harrisburg, a domestic partnership or life
partnership can be terminated by executing a notice of termination. 25 None of
these termination provisions contains a mechanism for distributing the
property of the parties or dealing with other breakup-related issues. Except
when one partner dies, there is a waiting period of twelve months in
Philadelphia and Pittsburgh before either partner can enter into a new
registered partnership.26
In Devlin v. City of Philadelphia,the Pennsylvania Supreme Court -ruled
that the City of Philadelphia had acted within its authority when it created its
life partnership registry. Yet the court's decision underscores the limited
nature of the benefits provided by these registries, because the court's decision
was based on the fact that "life partnership" status "is, in essence, merely a
label that the City can use to identify individuals to whom it desires to confer
certain limited local benefits."27 The court further described the rights and
benefits of life partners as "but a small fraction of what marriage affords to its
participants. '' 28
At the same time, however, the court struck down Philadelphia's
inclusion of "life partnership" as a protected category in the city's
nondiscrimination ordinance. The court held that the City had improperly
exercised its authority beyond the city limits by, in essence, requiring
individuals who neither work nor live in Philadelphia to register their
partnerships with the city in order to receive full protection under the city's
nondiscrimination ordinance. 29 The court further struck down the City's
exemption from realty transfer tax for transfers between life partners as a

22. PITrSBURGH, PA. CODE § 186.08(1) (2008).
23. Id. § 186.08(3); HARRISBURG, PA. CODE § 4-205.2, .5 (2009); Phila. Comm'n on Human
Relations, supra note 12.
24. PHILA., PA. CODE § 9-1106(2)(c) (2008).
25. HARRISBURG, PA. CODE § 4-203.2 (2009); PrrrSBURGH, PA. CODE § 186.06(2) (2008). In
Harrisburg, if only one partner executes the notice of termination, then the City Clerk must send a copy of
the notice to the other life partner and the termination will take effect thirty days after the execution of the
notice of termination. HARRISBURG, PA. CODE § 4-203.2 (2009).
26. PHILA., PA. CODE § 9-1106(2)(a)(iv) (2008); PITTSBURGH, PA. CODE § 186.06(3) (2008).
27. Devlin v. City of Philadelphia, 862 A.2d 1234, 1244 (Pa. 2004).
28. Id.
29. Id. at 1247-48.
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violation of the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution, which
requires all taxes to be uniform on the same class of subjects. °
II. ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF OBTAINING LEGAL RECOGNITION

Without access to marriage and only limited legal recognition under city
registries, Pennsylvania same-sex couples must take other steps to obtain
recognition for their relationships. To partially replicate the legal rights and
obligations associated with marriage, 3 same-sex couples will need to draft a
number of documents, including domestic partnership agreements, wills and
will substitutes, powers of attorney, advance directives, and hospital visitation
authorizations. To further signal their commitment to each other, the couple
may wish to change one or both of their surnames. These documents and the
judicial procedure for name changes will each be discussed separately below.
A. Domestic PartnershipAgreements
In the absence of a comprehensive set of legal rights and obligations, a
same-sex couple may formalize their relationship by entering into a private,
contractual arrangement, which may alternatively be called a "domestic
partnership," "cohabitation," or "living together" agreement (here, I opt for
"domestic partnership agreement"). A domestic partnership agreement may
cover a number of different subjects. It may address, for example, the pooling
of income during the relationship; the division of responsibilities for
household chores and expenses; and/or the division of property, support
payments, and dispute resolution upon the couple's separation.
No reported decision in Pennsylvania specifically addresses the
enforceability of a domestic partnership agreement between same-sex
partners. In Knauerv. Knauer,however, the Pennsylvania Superior Court held
that an agreement between unmarried partners is enforceable so long as it is
"not predominantly based on sexual consideration."32 In an unreported

30. ld.at 1248-51.
31. Even the most diligent couple can never precisely duplicate all of the legal rights and obligations
of marriage. There are certain rights and obligations of marriage that only the state itself can grant (e.g.,
exemptions from taxation and immunity from being called to testify against a spouse).
32. Knauer v. Knauer, 470 A.2d 553, 566 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983). It is worth noting that, under
Pennsylvania's Uniform Written Obligations Act,"[a] written release or promise.., made and signed by
the person releasing or promising, shall not be invalid or unenforceable for lack of consideration, if the
writing also contains an additional express statement, in any form of language, that the signer intends to
be legally bound." 33 PA. STAT. § 6 (2008).
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decision citing Knauer,the Court of Common Pleas for Northampton County
enforced a property settlement agreement between same-sex partners and, in
doing so, held that the agreement was not against public policy.3 3
Regardless of its enforceability, a domestic partnership agreement
evidences the familial nature of the relationship between the partners. It may
also provide evidence of the parties' intent regarding the sharing and titling
of property. Indeed, in Swails v. Haberer,a federal court in a diversity suit
applied Pennsylvania law to distribute a same-sex couple's jointly owned
property "after the dissolution of their same-sex domestic partnership."34
There was some dispute in that case about the nature of the property interest
that the parties intended to create when they purchased their home. A
domestic partnership agreement might have aided the court in determining
whether the parties truly intended to create a joint tenancy with right of
survivorship with respect to their home.
B. Wills and Will Substitutes
1. Wills
a. Avoiding Intestate Succession
If a member of a same-sex couple dies without a will (or without a
comprehensive will), the laws of intestate succession will apply.35 In
Pennsylvania, a surviving different-sex spouse inherits the entire estate if the
decedent dies intestate and has no surviving parent or issue.36 If the decedent
dies intestate and is survived by a parent or issue, then the surviving differentsex spouse is entitled to receive a portion of the estate.3 7
Any portion of the decedent's estate not passing to a surviving differentsex spouse passes, in the following order, to: (1) issue, (2) parents, (3) siblings
and their issue, (4) grandparents and their issue, (5) uncles and aunts and their
issue, or (6) the Commonwealth ofPennsylvania.38 Obviously, laws governing
intestate succession make no provision for inheritance by same-sex partners
or by the decedent's nonbiological, nonadopted children. If a lesbian or gay

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Cherkis v. Curzi, No. 1989-CE-6173 (Pa. Ct. C.P. Aug. 30, 1991).
Swails v. Haberer, No. 02-7095, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17727 (E.D. Pa. 2004).
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2101(a) (2008).
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2102 (2008).
Id.
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2103 (2008).
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man wishes to provide for his/her partner and any nonbiological, nonadopted
children upon his/her death, it will therefore be necessary to execute a will
that expresses those intentions.
b. Testamentary Guardianshipsof Minor Children
In addition, if a same-sex couple has children and only one partner is
legally recognized as a parent, the legal parent's death without a will could
also jeopardize the surviving partner's ability to continue as guardian because
it would fall to the courts to appoint a guardian.39 Through a will, the legally
recognized parent can, in this situation, appoint the surviving partner as the
testamentary guardian of the child.4" In construing the legal force of the statute
permitting a sole surviving parent to appoint a testamentary guardian, the
Pennsylvania Superior Court has explained:
[T]he statute necessarily raises a prima facie presumption in favor of the
testamentary appointment. However, the presumption, as with similar presumptions
in favor of the parent, is not irrebuttable. The appointment may be defeated upon a
showing of convincing reasons as to why it should not stand. The challenging party
bears the burdens of production and persuasion; that burden is a heavy one."

c. Controlof Decedent's Remains
A further question may arise concerning who will have the authority to
dispose of a partner's remains after death. By statute, a surviving different-sex
spouse is granted "the sole authority in all matters pertaining to the disposition
of the remains of the decedent."4' 2 If there is no surviving different-sex spouse,
then, "absent an allegation of enduring estrangement, incompetence, contrary
intent or waiver and agreement which is proven by clear and convincing
evidence," the next of kin of the decedent have the sole authority to dispose
of the remains.43 For this purpose, "next of kin" is defined as the decedent's
spouse and blood relatives, in the order that they would take the decedent's
estate under the laws of intestate succession.'

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

20 PA. CONS. STAT.
20 PA. CONS. STAT.
In re Slaughter, 738
20 PA. CONS. STAT.
20 PA. CONS. STAT.
20 PA. CONS. STAT.

§§ 5111-5167 (2008).
§ 2519 (2008).
A.2d 1013, 1017-18 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
§ 305(b) (2008).
§ 305(c).
§ 305(e).
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Neither a same-sex partner nor a nonbiological child of the decedent
would qualify as next of kin under this definition. Nevertheless, in a decision
that predates the current statute, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated, "[a]
more distant relative, or even a friend, not connected by ties of blood, may
have a superior right, under exceptional circumstances, to one nearer of kin."45
With regard to the need under the current statute to prove enduring
estrangement or incompetence in order to overcome the preference for next
of kin, it would seem that the circumstances would truly need to be
exceptional for a surviving same-sex partner to be given control of the
deceased partner's remains.
More promising, however, is the possibility of proving that the statutory
preference for a surviving different-sex spouse or next of kin does not reflect
the decedent's wishes. At common law, it had been said that "how far the
desires of the decedent should prevail against those of a surviving husband or
wife is an open question, but as against remoter connections, such wishes
especially if strongly and recently expressed, should usually prevail."4' 6 By its
own terms, the current statute seems to go further by specifying that its
directions concerning who shall have control of the decedent's remains are
"subject to the provisions of a valid will executed by the decedent."47 It may
thus be useful to express burial wishes in a will. Although, as a practical
matter, a will may not be located or read until burial arrangements have
already been made and completed.
It would, therefore, be wise to take additional steps to specify a wish that
a surviving same-sex partner have authority to dispose of one's remains. The
statutory preference for a surviving different-sex spouse or next of kin can be
defeated through a showing, by clear and convincing evidence, of a contrary
intent on the part of the decedent.4 8 A "contrary intent" is defined as "[a]n
explicit and sincere expression, either verbal or written, of a decedent adult
or emancipated minor prior to death and not subsequently revoked that a
person other than the one authorized by this section determine the final
disposition of his remains."49 To take advantage of this exception, same-sex
partners should probably each execute a separate written document expressing
their wishes concerning who should have custody of their remains and,
perhaps, keep that document with their advance directives or other documents

45.

Pettigrew v. Pettigrew, 56 A. 878, 880 (Pa. 1904).

46.
47.

Id.
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 305(a) (2008).
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 305(b)-(c).
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 305(e).

48.
49.
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likely to be located and read near the time of death. Verbal expressions of
these same wishes to each partner's next of kin would also be advisable, so as
to ensure that the decedent's wishes are, to paraphrase the statute, explicitly
and sincerely communicated to those most likely to object to allowing a
surviving partner to take control of the decedent's remains. If this exception
applies, then the court is empowered to "enter an appropriate order regarding
the final disposition which may include appointing an attorney in fact to
arrange the final disposition."5
d Will Contests
Even where both partners have executed a comprehensive will, there is
still the possibility of a will contest by a disgruntled relative on the grounds
of undue influence or lack of testamentary capacity. The recent case of Estate
of Meade Easby5 1 represents an interesting twist on the usual will contest
scenario. In that case, a disgruntled distant relative, oblivious to the
relationship between a wealthy gay man and his long-time partner, took his
case to the Pennsylvania attorney general because a charity had been a larger
beneficiary under the decedent's prior will. The relative managed to convince
the attorney general's office to get involved in the case in its role as protector
of charitable organizations.
In Estate ofMeade Easby, based on an exhaustive review of the facts, the
court ultimately rejected the claim that the decedent's long-time partner had
exerted undue influence over him. In rejecting the claim, the court noted the
irony that the couple's intermingling of their finances-as specifically
contemplated by their registration as life partners with the City of
Philadelphia-had been used as evidence of undue influence.52 In a lesson for
those who prepare wills for same-sex couples, the attorney who wrote the
decedent's will took care to lay the groundwork for defending the will against
claims of undue influence and lack of testamentary capacity by meeting with
the testator both with his partner and then separately from his partner;
moreover, the attorney conducted a separate meeting to go over the will's

50. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 305(d)(1).
51. Estate of Meade Easby, No. 069427,2008 Phila. Ct. Com. PI. LEXIS 152 (Pa. Ct. C.P. June 25,
2008).
52. Id. at *60-61.
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terms one last time right before it was signed." In addition, the attorney had
the testator sign the will outside the presence of his partner.54
2. Living Trusts
A so-called "living trust" is an alternative to a will for directing the
distribution of property at death while retaining control over it during life. In
Pennsylvania, a trust can be created through a "transfer of property under a
written instrument to another person as trustee during the settlor's lifetime."55
A trust can be created for any lawful purpose; however, the same person
56
cannot be the sole trustee and sole beneficiary of a trust.
In its function as a will substitute, a living trust typically involves the
transfer of a portion of the settlor's property in trust with the retention of
income from the trust during life. Any remaining property is distributed to
specified individuals at the settlor's death as dictated by the terms of the trust.
The settlor retains control of the property during her life by naming herself
trustee and retaining the right to revoke or amend the trust during life.57
The advantages of a living trust include: (1) the ability to avoid the
probate and administration process, (2) the ability of a co-trustee or successor
trustee to easily take over management ofthe trust in the event of the settlor's
incapacitation, and (3) the decreased possibility of challenges on the basis of
undue influence or lack of capacity.5" With regard to this last advantage, living
trusts are thought to be less susceptible to challenge both because they are
more difficult to detect-unlike wills, they are not open to public
inspection 5 9-and, if established well in advance of death, because the
transferor "can be shown to have exercised dominion and control and an
awareness of the trust's terms. 6 °

53.
54.
55.

Id.at*31-33.
Id. at *34.

20 PA. CONS. STAT.

§ 773 1(1)

(2008).

56. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 7732, 7734 (2008).
57. In Pennsylvania, the right to revoke or amend a trust exists "unless the trust instrument expressly
provides that the trust is irrevocable." 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7752(a) (2008).
58. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7736 (2008).
59. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7754 (2008), Joint State Gov't Comm. cmt. ("Tihere is no
requirement that a trust instrument be filed with the Register of Wills or elsewhere in the public records
.)e
....
60. Matthew R. Dubois, Note, Legal Planningfor Gay, Lesbian, and Non-TraditionalElders, 63
ALB. L. REv. 263, 322 (1999); see also Jennifer Tulin McGrath, The Ethical Responsibilitiesof Estate
PlanningAttorneys in the Representationof Non-Traditional Couples, 27 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 75, 93

(2003).
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The disadvantages of a living trust include: (1) the cost of establishing
and administering the trust, including attorney's fees to prepare the trust and
the cost of transferring title of assets to the trust; (2) the need for a will to pass
any property not transferred to the trust; and (3) the need for a will to appoint
a testamentary guardian for the settlor's minor children.6 It is also worth
noting that a living trust provides no federal or state tax advantages over a
will. During life, the trust property should continue to be treated as if the
settlor owned it herself for federal and state income tax purposes.6 2 At death,
the trust property should be included in the settlor's gross estate for federal
63
estate tax purposes and should be subject to Pennsylvania inheritance tax.
3. Joint Tenancy with Right of Survivorship
In Pennsylvania, same-sex couples can hold title to property either as
tenants in common or as joint tenants with right of survivorship. If property
is held as tenants in common, a deceased partner's share of the property passes
under her will or state intestacy laws to her beneficiaries or heirs, making the
property subject to the probate and administration process. In contrast, if the
property is held as joint tenants with right of survivorship, then the deceased
partner's share of the property automatically passes to the survivor by
operation of law, avoiding the probate and administration process. Because of
the automatic nature of this transfer, joint tenancies with right of survivorship
are another alternative for directing the distribution of property at death.
In Pennsylvania, there is a statutory presumption against the creation of
a joint tenancy with right of survivorship.' The Pennsylvania Supreme Court
has held that the intent to create a right of survivorship "must be expressed
with sufficient clarity to overcome the statutory presumption that survivorship
is not intended."65 The question is essentially one of the intent of the parties,
and "no particular form of words is required to manifest such an intention."66

61.
62.
63.
64.

See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
I.R.C. §§ 671, 676, 677 (2006); 61 PA. CODE § 105.1 (2009).
I.R.C. §§ 2036, 2038 (2006); 72 PA. STAT. § 9107(c)(5), (7) (2008).
68 PA. STAT. § 110 (2008).

65. Zomisky v. Zamiska, 296 A.2d 722, 723 (Pa. 1972); see also In re Estate of Quick, 905 A.2d
471, 474 (2006) (stating that a joint tenancy with right of survivorship "must be created by express words

or by necessary implication").
66. Zomisky, 296 A.2d at 723; see also In re Estate of Quick, 905 A.2d at 474 (indicating that
"courts have found the intent to create a [joint tenancy with right of survivorship] trumps the use of
imprecise or improper language in creating it").
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Thus, although joint tenancies have the advantage of being essentially
free to create, it is necessary to ensure that the intent to create the right of
survivorship is clearly expressed. As mentioned earlier, 67 a domestic
partnership agreement that sets forth the partners' intent in the titling of their
assets and the sharing of property might be a useful tool for avoiding disputes
about otherwise ambiguous language. 6' Like living trusts, joint tenancies are
thought to be less susceptible to attack on grounds of undue influence.6 9
Weighed against these advantages, however, are potential tax disadvantages,
because the creation ofaj oint tenancy may have federal gift tax consequences
and the property may also be subject to state inheritance tax-as well as
potentially adverse federal estate tax consequences-at the death of a co70
owner.

C. DurablePowers of Attorney
A durable power of attorney allows the named agent to act even after the
principal becomes incapacitated.7 The durable power of attorney can take
effect immediately or it can "spring" into effect at a specific time or upon the
happening of a specific event (e.g., the incapacity of the principal).72 Without
a durable power of attorney, a guardian of the estate would have to be
appointed for the incapacitated individual in order to administer her finances.

67. See supra text accompanying note 34.
68. If a court finds any doubt as to the meaning in the terms of a grant, such ambiguous terms
should:
receive a reasonable construction, and one that will accord with the intention ofthe parties; and,
in order to ascertain their intention, the court must look at the circumstances under which the
grant was made. It is the intention of the parties which is the ultimate guide, and, in order to
ascertain that intention, the court may take into consideration the surrounding circumstances,
the situation of the parties, the objects they apparently have in view, and the nature of the
subject-matter of the agreement.
In re Estate of Quick, 905 A.2d at 474-75 (quoting Hindman v. Farren, 44 A.2d 241, 242 (Pa. 1945)
(citation omitted) (emphasis omitted)).
69. Patricia A. Cain, Tax and FinancialPlanningforSame-Sex Couples:RecommendedReading,
8 TUL. J.L. & SEXUALITY 613, 640 (1998).
70. I.R.C. § 2040 (2006); Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1 (h)(5) (as amended in 1997); 72 PA. STAT. § 9108
(2008). The federal estate tax consequences are potentially adverse because the entire value of the property
will be included in the gross estate of the first co-owner to pass away, unless her executor can demonstrate
the extent to which the survivor actually contributed (out of the survivor's own funds) to the purchase or
improvement of the property. Treas. Reg. § 20.2040-1 (a)(2) (as amended in 1960). In the case of property
held for many years (possibly even decades), this can be a difficult burden to bear and may result in over
taxation of the property.
71. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5604(b) (2008).
72. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5604(a).
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Whether the person's same-sex partner could be named guardian would
depend on whether the partner's interests are found to conflict with those of
the incapacitated person. 3 Though a family relationship, by itself, will not
amount to a conflict, 74 there are no reported decisions regarding same-sex
partners.
In case it proves necessary to appoint a guardian even when a durable
power of attorney has been executed, the principal can nominate a guardian
(e.g., her same-sex partner) in the durable power of attorney itself.75 A court
must follow a nomination in a power of attorney absent disqualification or a
showing of good cause. 76 Naturally, the same questions exist regarding
whether a same-sex partner's interests will be found to conflict with those of
the incapacitated person, resulting in disqualification of the same-sex partner
from being appointed guardian. Nonetheless, the courts have stated that a
nomination of guardian in a durable power of attorney "is given paramount
importance. 77
D. Advance Directives
In Pennsylvania, any individual who is of sound mind and who is at least
eighteen years old, a high school graduate, married, or an emancipated minor
can specify her wishes concerning the administration or withholding of lifesustaining treatment in a living will.78 Such an individual can also execute a
durable health care power of attorney to name a health care agent who can
make medical decisions on her behalf in the event she becomes incompetent
to do so herself.79
Without an advance directive, it has been held that a "close family
member," in conjunction with two physicians, can terminate life-sustaining
treatment for someone in a persistent vegetative state.80 There are no reported
decisions on whether a same-sex partner qualifies as a "close family member."
This creates uncertainty as well as the potential for costly battles with the
incapacitated partner's family. These problems can be avoided by executing

73. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 551 1(f) (2008).
74. Id.
75. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5604(c)(2).
76. Id.
77. In re Duran, 769 A.2d 497, 506 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
78. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5442 (2008).
79. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 5452, 5454, 5456 (2008).
80. In re Fiori, 673 A.2d 905 (Pa. 1996).
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a living will and a durable health care power of attorney (or a single document
combining them both)."'
Short of such a dire situation, it may be necessary to appoint a guardian
for an incapacitated person, leading to the same problems described above in
connection with the appointment of a guardian to administer an incapacitated
person's finances. In case it proves necessary to appoint a guardian--even
when an advance directive has been executed-the principal can nominate a
guardian (e.g., her same-sex partner) in the directive itself.82 Again, a court
must follow a nomination in a power of attorney absent disqualification or a
showing of good cause.83
E. Hospital Visitation
Patients in Pennsylvania hospitals have a long list of rights.84 However,
the right to be visited by whomever they wish is not among those rights, as it
is in other states.85 But a patient does have the right to access to a person
authorized to act on her behalf.86 In addition, as mentioned earlier, registered
domestic partners and life partners in Pittsburgh and Harrisburg have the same
hospital visitation rights as spouses in those cities. Otherwise, it is up to the
hospital to establish its own visitation policies.87
Lesbian and gay rights organizations often encourage same-sex couples
to execute documents authorizing them to visit each other in the hospital.
Though not legally binding, such a hospital visitation authorization, which
should be made to look as official as possible (i.e., it should be dated,
witnessed, and, if possible, notarized), can be used to persuade the hospital to
allow a same-sex partner to visit. It would also be wise to enlist the help of the
patient's doctor and the hospital's patient advocate when making a plea to
ease visitation restrictions.

81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5471 (2008).
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5460(b) (2008).
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5460(b).
28 PA. CODE § 103.22 (2009).
INFANTI, supra note 3, at 174-75.
28 PA. CODE § 103.22(b)(21) (2009).
E.g., 28 PA. CODE §§ 133.31(b)(10) (special care units), 137.21(b)(10) (obstetrics) (2009).
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F. Name Changes
To formally, legally change their surnames, a same-sex couple must apply
for court approval.8 8 In one case, a Court of Common Pleas judge in York
County refused to allow a woman to change her surname to that of her samesex partner, because to do so would offend law and public policy by creating
the appearance of a legal marriage between the couple. 9 On appeal, the
Superior Court held that the trial court judge had abused his discretion when
denying the name change petition.90 In reversing the trial court's decision and
granting the petition, the Superior Court cited Pennsylvania's liberal name
change policy, the lack of intent to defraud creditors, and cases from New
Jersey and Ohio that had granted similar name change petitions.91
Ill. ESTABLISHING A FAMILY
For same-sex couples, there are three general paths to having children:
foster parenting, adoption, and assisted reproductive technology (ART) (i.e.,
intrauterine insemination and/or in vitro fertilization for lesbian couples and
surrogacy for gay couples). Same-sex couples might also pursue a
combination ofthese paths to establish a family. For example, foster parenting
might be followed by an adoption of the foster child or a nonbiological parent
might adopt a child conceived by a couple through the help of ART. Each of
these different paths (or potential combination of paths) to establishing a
family will be discussed separately below.
A. FosterParenting
In Pennsylvania, the minimal requirements for foster parenting include:
(1) being at least 21 years old, (2) passing a medical screening, and (3) passing
child abuse and criminal history clearances.92 No mention is made in these
requirements of excluding individuals or couples on the basis of sexual
orientation or unmarried cohabitation. In fact, in its frequently asked questions
about foster parenting, the Pennsylvania State Resource Family Association
states that a foster parent can be "single, married, divorced or in a

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

54 PA. CONS. STAT. § 701 (2008).
In re Miller, 824 A.2d 1207, 1209 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2003).
Id.at 1214.
Id. at 1210-13.
55 PA. CODE § 3700.62 (2009).
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partnership." 93 Thus, in contrast to states such as Alabama, Arkansas,
Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, and Utah, 94 Pennsylvania does not
explicitly restrict the ability of same-sex couples to serve as foster parents.
B. Adoption
95
In Pennsylvania, "[a]ny individual may become an adopting parent.
Normally, however, a legal parent must relinquish parental rights before a
nonspouse can adopt the child. 96 Strictly construed, this requirement would
prevent one of the parents in a lesbian or gay family from ever being legally
recognized.

1. Second-ParentAdoption
Fortunately, in a unanimous decision,9 7 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
joined the appellate courts of a handful of other states in broadly reading the
Pennsylvania adoption laws to afford courts the discretion to waive statutory
requirements for an adoption where cause is shown. 98 In Adoption of R.B.F.
andR.C.F., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court opened the door to second-parent
adoptions (and, it seems, to joint adoptions) by same-sex couples whenever
(1) cause can be shown to waive the requirement that the existing parents'
rights must be terminated and (2) the adoption is in the best interest of the
child. 99

In that case, the parents argued that cause existed for waiving the
statutory requirement because the waiver was necessary to preserve family
integrity. "' In the routine adoption, it is necessary to require the existing legal
parents to relinquish their parental rights in order to preserve the integrity of
the adoptive family.' However, in the case of a second-parent adoption-as

93. Pa. State Res. Family Ass'n, Is Foster Parentingfor Me?, http'J/www.psrfa.org/psrfa_
10-30-09 004.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2009).
94. INFANTI, supra note 3, at 213 (discussing Alabama, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Dakota, and
Utah); McKinley & Goodstein, supra note 2 (discussing Arkansas).
95. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2312 (2008).
96. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2711, 2901, 2903 (2008).
97. In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 2002).
98. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2901 (2008); see INFANTI, supra note 3, at 218-19 (describing how the
District of Columbia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and New York "have likewise broadly construed
existing adoption laws to embrace second-parent adoptions").
99. In re Adoption of R.B.F. and R.C.F., 803 A.2d at 1201-02.
100. Id. at 1201.
101. Id.
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in the case of a stepparent adoption--enforcing the statutory requirement
would actually undermine family integrity by requiring one parent to
relinquish her parental rights so that the other parent might be legally
recognized. 2 ' Thus, in the context ofa second-parent adoption, preserving the
existing legal parent's rights is the only way to guarantee the integrity of the
family, which means that waiving the statutory requirement is the only means
of assuring that its purpose is achieved. 3
While this is certainly a salutary development, there is reason to be
cautious. The court's decision still affords trial courts significant discretion
in granting second-parent adoptions. It also takes time to complete a secondparent adoption and, during that time, one parent will not be a legally
recognized parent. Furthermore, it is unsettled whether other states must
recognize adoptions by same-sex couples. 04
' Accordingly, it may be advisable
to prepare backup documentation to help ensure that the parent-child
relationship will be legally recognized. Such documentation would include a
shared- or co-parenting agreement, a nomination of guardian, and powers of
attorney. Of these documents, shared-parenting agreements and standby
guardianships merit further discussion below.' 05

102. Id.
103. Id.
104. INFANTI, supranote 3, at 222 (discussing an unsuccessful attempt by the State of Oklahoma and
an on-going attempt by the State of Louisiana to refuse recognition to adoptions by same-sex couples). The
federal district court ruled in favor of the adopting parents in the Louisiana case, but the state has appealed
that decision and the case is currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Bill
Barrow, House Votes to Restrict Revised Birth Certificates, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 13, 2009, at 4.
Thumbing its collective nose at the federal district court's decision, the Louisiana House of Representatives
passed a bill that would prohibit birth certificates from being revised to show the names of two adoptive
parents who are unmarried. Id. That bill died in the Louisiana Senate. La. State Legislature, Final
Disposition of House Bills: 2009 Regular Legislative Session, http://www.legis.state.la.us/ (last visited
Nov. 5, 2009) (reporting that House Bill 60 died on the Senate calendar).
105. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 560 1(a) (2008) (allowing all powers that may be delegated to an agent to
be the subject of a power of attorney); seeIn re Adoption of Wolfe, 312 A.2d 793, 796-97 (Pa. 1973) ("The
performance of parental duties does not mean that a parent must personally take care of the child. The
responsibility of performing parental duties may be met if the parent has made reasonable arrangements for
the temporary care of the child."); E.A.L. v. L.J.W., 662 A.2d 1109, 1111 & n.l (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(mentioning that a child's biological mother had executed a "power of attorney over minor children" and
an "authorization to consent to medical and dental treatment for minor children" in favor of her parents
when she effectively transferred care and custody of the children to her parents).
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2. Shared-ParentingAgreement
A shared-parenting agreement sets forth the rights and responsibilities of
the parents, addressing custody, visitation, and support issues in the event of
a breakup. There is some question about whether a shared-parenting
agreement is enforceable in Pennsylvania. 1"6 Nevertheless, in Pettinger v.
Serino, °7 the court relied on Knauerv. Knauer"°8 to find that enforcing a child
support agreement between unmarried heterosexual cohabitants would not
violate public policy.
Even if not specifically enforceable, a shared-parenting agreement may
nevertheless provide evidence to bolster the nonlegal parent's case for
applying existing legal doctrines (e.g., in loco parentis)to obtain custody or
visitation. 9 The agreement can also be a useful tool for convincing third
parties (e.g., schools) to respect intact lesbian and gay families and to
communicate and interact with both parents.
3. Standby Guardianship
The custodial parent, legal custodian, or legal guardian of a child can
designate a standby guardian for the child."0 The designation can be made
contingent upon the occurrence of a triggering event (e.g., the incapacity or
death of the parent), and different standby guardians can be designated for
different triggering events.' However, the consent of the child's other parent
is necessary if her parental rights have not been terminated, her whereabouts
are known, and she is willing and able to care for the child." 2 Upon the

106. See J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 1995 Phila. Cty. Rptr. LEXIS 66 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1995), rev'd,682 A.2d 1314
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) ("had the parties entered into the 'co-parenting' contract, it would have been void as
against the weight of the law and ... public policy").
107. Pettinger v. Serino, 36 Pa. D. & C.4th 324 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1996). The court did, however, find the
terms of the child support agreement in Pettingerto be unconscionable. Under the agreement, the father
had agreed to pay child support equal to three times what he would owe under state guidelines. But the
court did not set aside the agreement on that ground, deciding instead to reform the terms of the contract.
108. Knauer v. Knauer, 470 A.2d 553 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983); see supra note 32 and accompanying
text.
109. See J.A.L. v. E.P.H., 682 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (pointing to the legal documents
executed by two lesbian partners as evidence of intent to create a parent-child relationship between the
nonbiological mother and the child and noting that the biological mother did not execute a shared-parenting
agreement only because she was advised that it would be unenforceable).
110. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5611 (2008).
111. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 561 l(c)(l).
112. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 561 l(a)-(b).
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occurrence of the triggering event, the standby guardian has the authority to
act as the child's guardian (in the event of the death of the parent) or
coguardian (in the event of, for example, the incapacity of the parent)." 3 A
petition for court approval of the designation of the standby guardian must be
filed no later than sixty days after the occurrence of a triggering event;
otherwise, the standby guardian loses the legal authority to act as guardian or
coguardian of the child." "
In the case of a coguardianship, the commencement of the standby
guardianship will not, by itself, divest the parent of any parental rights; rather,
the standby guardian will merely obtain "concurrent or shared custody of the
child.""115 Indeed, the standby guardian must "assure frequent and continuing
contact with and physical access to the child and shall further assure the
involvement of the parent, to include, to the greatest extent possible, in the
decision making on behalf of the child.""' 6 Once the parent has regained
capacity, as determined by a licensed physician, the standby guardian's
authority to act ceases and the standby guardian must return the child to the
parent's care." 7 A designation of standby guardian can be revoked either
before or after a petition for court approval has been filed."'
C. Assisted Reproductive Technology
1. IntrauterineInsemination/In Vitro Fertilization
Pennsylvania has not adopted section 702 of the Uniform Parentage Act,
which unequivocally states that a "donor is not a parent of a child conceived
by means of assisted reproduction." Without a statute dealing with paternity
in the case of intrauterine insemination or in vitro fertilization, it has been left
to the courts to develop the applicable rules in this area.
In Fergusonv. McKiernan," 9 a woman approached a man with whom she
had formerly been romantically involved, asking him to donate sperm to her
for use in conceiving a child. The man and woman entered into an oral
agreement patterned after those used in anonymous sperm donor

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5613(a) (2008).
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5613(b).
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5613(a), (c).
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5613(a).
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5613(d).
23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5614 (2008).
Ferguson v. McKieman, 940 A.2d 1236 (Pa. 2007).

2009]

SURVEYING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE

arrangements. Under the agreement, the man's role in the conception was to
be kept a secret (i.e., he was to be an anonymous donor to all but the mother).
The woman agreed never to seek financial support from the man and to raise
the children on her own. Conception occurred in a clinical setting through the
use of in vitro fertilization because the woman had previously undergone an
irreversible tubal ligation.
In its decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that "there appears
to be a growing consensus that clinical, institutional sperm donation neither
imposes obligations nor confers privileges upon the sperm donor."' 2 °
Concerned that a contrary holding would throw the treatment of all
anonymous sperm donor arrangements in doubt, the court held that the
agreement not to seek support was enforceable. However, a known donor who
is involved in the child's life as a parent may have a support obligation.'
2. Surrogacy
There are two types of surrogacy arrangements: "traditional" surrogacy
and "gestational" surrogacy. In traditional surrogacy, conception is normally
achieved through intrauterine insemination, making the surrogate both the
birth mother and biological mother of the child.' 22 In gestational surrogacy, a
donor's egg is fertilized using in vitro fertilization and then implanted in the
surrogate, making the surrogate the birth mother but not the biological mother
surrogacy
of the child.'23 Beginning in the mid-1990s, gestational
"overwhelmingly became the preferred arrangement."' 24
As one court has put it, "the law [in Pennsylvania] has not yet caught up
with the science that makes conception by in vitro fertilization... using a
gestational carrier possible.' 25 There are no Pennsylvania statutes concerning
surrogacy specifically; however, the Department of Health does have a policy
on obtaining an assisted conception birth certificate where a gestational carrier
is used and the child is born in Pennsylvania. To obtain a birth certificate
listing the intended parents' names, the parents must submit the following
documents to the Division of Vital Records of the Pennsylvania Department
120. Id.at 1246.
121. See Jacob v. Schultz-Jacob, 923 A.2d 473 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
122. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Surrogacyandthe PoliticsofCommodification 14 (Columbia Law Sch.
Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Group, Paper No. 186, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=
1282330.
123. Id.
124. Id.at 16.
125. In re I.L.P., 965 A.2d 251, 252 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009) (quoting trial court).
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of Health: (1) a Certificate of Live Birth (Form H 105.142), (2) a Supplemental
Report of Assisted Conception (Form H105.030), and (3) a certified copy of
a court order stating that certified copies of the child's birth records must
reflect the names of the intended parents.'26
Whenever possible, the intended parents are advised to obtain a prebirth
order from the relevant court:
A pre-birth order clarifies the rights of those involved and aids hospital staff in
regard to whom to release the child at time of discharge and for the purpose of
hospital staff or a physician obtaining consent or input in the unlikely event of
medical complications. A pre-birth order also allows the Division of Vital Records
to provide a birth certificate more promptly soon after birth than a post-birth order
would allow. This could be important especially in an instance where the parents are
from out of state or from another country, and the parents need to make travel
arrangements to get the newborn home with them. 27

According to the Department of Health, "most courts seem willing to issue an
order in advance of the birth"; however, "the situation in Pennsylvania is
somewhat unsettled," with some counties apparently refusing to entertain
petitions to have the intended parents' names entered on the birth
certificate. ' In counties where petitions are entertained, the Division of Vital
Records is amenable to reviewing completed petitions (with exhibits) and,
unless they "have concerns or comments, sign[ing] the Stipulation and
return[ing] it to petitioners' counsel" for filing with the court.'2 9
Pennsylvania remains an unattractive jurisdiction in which to enter into
these contracts, since it is unclear whether Pennsylvania courts will hold
surrogacy contracts valid and enforceable. 3 ° In the absence of legal authority
affirming the validity of surrogacy contracts, it is necessary to be mindful of
the general legal restrictions in Pennsylvania regarding the expenses that
adopting parents may permissibly pay 3 ' as well as the criminal punishment
that exists for "trading, bartering, buying, selling, or dealing in infant
children."' 32 These restrictions can be especially relevant when the parents are

126. Memorandum from Div. of Vital Records, Pa. Dep't of Health, ImportantNotice: Assisted
Conception Birth Registrations(Oct. 2003) (on file with author).
127. Letter from Stephanie Michel-Segnor, Senior Counsel, Office of Legal Counsel, Pa. Dep't of
Health (Nov. 4, 2005) (on file with author).
128. Id.at 1-2.
129. Id at 3.
130. See J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d 1261, 1265 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006), appealdenied, 909 A.2d 1290 (Pa.
2006) ("declin[ing] to comment on the validity of surrogacy contracts").
131. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2533(d) (2008).
132. 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4305 (2008).
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located in a county that does not entertain assisted conception birth certificate
petitions and instead requires the child to be adopted.'33
Notwithstanding the outstanding questions concerning the validity of
surrogacy contracts in Pennsylvania, in J.F. v. D.B., the court held that a
gestational surrogate had no legal standing to challenge the biological father's
custody of the children to whom she gave birth.' 34 The court held that the
surrogate, acting in defiance of the father, was neither the legal mother nor
stood in loco parentiswith respect to the children.
In another case, the Orphans' Court issued a decree directing the
biological father of twins being carried by a married gestational surrogate to
be named as the sole parent on the birth certificate.' Before Taiwan would
grant the children dual citizenship through their biological father, it required
a judicial declaration that the surrogate and her husband had no parental
rights. The Superior Court held that the Orphans' Court had the authority to
modify its earlier decree to indicate that the surrogate and her husband had no
parental rights with regard to the children.
IV. BREAKUP OF FAMILIES
A. Lesbian and Gay Families
In the absence of a second-parent adoption or a shared-parenting
agreement, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held in T.B. v. L.R.M. 31 6 that the
former same-sex partner of a child's biological mother had standing to seek
custody or visitation using the in loco parentis doctrine. Whether custody or
visitation will be awarded depends on the child's best interest.'37 To obtain
primary custody, the partner must overcome the legal parent's prima facie
right to custody and prove by clear and convincing evidence that the award of
custody is in the best interest of the child.'

133. Letter from Stephanie Michel-Segnor, supra note 127, at 4.
134. J.F. v. D.B., 897 A.2d at 1276-77, 1279, 1280. In a later appeal, the Superior Court held that
the father had no right to return of the child support that he had paid during the time that the surrogate was
caring for his children. J.F. v. D.B., 941 A.2d 718 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).
135. In re I.L.P., 965 A.2d 251(Pa. Super. Ct. 2009). The biological father in this case was a party
to a New Jersey registered domestic partnership.
136. T.B. v. L.R.M., 786 A.2d 913, 914 (Pa. 2001).
137. See T.B. v. L.R.M., 874 A.2d 34 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (later appeal ofcourt's application of best
interest standard).
138. Jones v. Jones, 884 A.2d 915 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (awarding primary custody to legal parent's
former same-sex partner).
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In loco parentis status not only affords a nonlegal parent standing to
pursue custody or visitation of a former same-sex partner's child, but also
comes with potential child support obligations. InL.S.K. v. H.A.N., the court
held that the legal parent's former partner was equitably estopped from
asserting that she had no obligation to support their five children when she had
taken on a parental role, cared for the children, and sought custody of them
following the breakup of the relationship.
B. StraightFamilies
Custody and visitation issues can also arise when a lesbian or gay man
has children from a former heterosexual relationship. For decades, the case
law regarding such custody and visitation issues was overtly hostile to
lesbians and gay men. In ConstantA. v. PaulC.A., a panel of the Pennsylvania
Superior Court held that, though homosexuality was not a per se basis for
denying visitation or partial custody, it was always a relevant consideration
in making custody and visitation decisions."' Where each of the parents was
in a relationship, the heterosexual parent's "traditional" (whether marital or
nonmarital) family environment benefited from a "presumption of
regularity."'' In contrast, the lesbian or gay parent had to prove that there was
no adverse effect on the child from his/her same-sex relationship, creating a
42
presumption against custody or visitation for the lesbian or gay parent. 1
4 3 the court upheld
Applying this standard in Pascarellav. Pascarella,'
an
order granting a gay father partial custody of his children, but restricting him
from visiting with his children in the presence of his same-sex partner. But in
Blew v. Verta,'" the court held that other people's reactions to a mother's
lesbian relationship could not, alone, serve as a basis for restricting her
custody.
Fortunately, in an en banc decision, the Pennsylvania Superior Court has
now overruled these earlier decisions. In MA.T. v. G.S.T., the court stated in
no uncertain terms:

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

L.S.K. v. H.A.N., 813 A.2d 872 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002).
Constant A. v. Paul C.A., 496 A.2d 1, 9-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985).
Id.at 5,10.
Id.at 10; see also Barron v. Barron, 594 A.2d 682, 687 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991).
Pascarella v. Pascarella, 512 A.2d 715 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986).
Blew v. Verta, 617 A.2d 31 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
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[W]e overrule both the holding and the reasoning in Constant and its progeny
(including Pascarellaand Barron),and conclude that a homosexual parent bears no
special evidentiary presumption in a child custody case....
[I]n establishing an evidentiary presumption against a parent involved in a
homosexual relationship, the three-judge panel in Constantviolated the basic precept
that the sole focus of a child custody proceeding should be on the best interests of
the child-without either parent bearing the burden of proof. Moreover, Constant's
evidentiary presumption is based upon unsupported preconceptions and
prejudices-including that the sexual orientation of a parent will have an adverse
effect on the child, and that the traditional heterosexual household is superior to that
of the household of a parent involved in a same sex relationship. Such
preconceptions and prejudices have no proper place in child custody cases, where the
decision should be based exclusively upon a determination of the best interests of the
child given the evidence presented to the trial court. 45

As described above,' 46 for some time now, the Pennsylvania courts have
been relatively good at handling legal issues involving lesbian and gay
families (e.g., by interpreting state adoption law to permit second-parent
adoptions and by applying the in loco parentis doctrine to allow a former
same-sex partner with no legal connection to a child of the relationship to
nonetheless obtain custody or visitation). This resulted in a significant
dissonance between the advancing state of the law concerning the breakup of
lesbian and gay families and the stagnant (notice that Constantand Pascarella
both date back to the 1980s) state of the law concerning the breakup of a
relationship between a man and a woman, one of whom happens to be lesbian
or gay. Though long overdue, the decision in MA. T. begins to bring these two
areas of family law into line by overruling antiquated cases that had placed the
focus in child custody cases not on what is best for the child involved, but on
expressing hostility toward lesbians and gay men.
V. MISCELLANY

A. Alimony
In Kripp v. Kripp,147 a divorcing couple entered into a property settlement
agreement under which the husband would pay the wife alimony for up to five
years. After two years, however, payments would cease "should wife

145. M.A.T. v. G.S.T., 2010 Pa. Super. LEXIS 13, at *P14, *P16 (Jan. 21, 2010) (footnotes omitted).
146. See supra Parts ll.B.1, V.A.
147. Kripp v. Kripp, 849 A.2d 1159, 1160 (Pa. 2004).

UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:187

cohabitate. ' "' Husband stopped making payments after two years because
49
wife was cohabitating with a woman.1
Wife contended that the term "cohabitate" should have the meaning
ascribed to it by Pennsylvania domestic relations law and should only apply
to living with someone of the "opposite sex."'' ° Husband contended that the
term was ambiguous, especially given that wife's involvement in a same-sex
relationship contributed to their divorce.' The court held that the term was
ambiguous and that the trial court had not erred by (1) admitting parol
evidence on its meaning; and (2) on that basis, ruling that
husband's alimony
52
obligation ended after the guaranteed two-year period. 1
B. Unemployment Benefits
An individual is not entitled to unemployment benefits ifshe "voluntarily
leav[es] work without cause of a necessitous and compelling nature."' 53 Under
the "following the spouse doctrine," a married individual (but not an
unmarried cohabitant) can show necessitous and compelling cause to leave a
job to follow a spouse if (1) the spouse moved for reasons beyond her control
and "the decision to move was reasonable and made in good faith," and
(2) "the couple would face an economic hardship in maintaining two
residences or the move has resulted in an insurmountable commuting
problem."' 5 4
In Procitov. Unemployment CompensationBoardofReview,'55 the court
faced the question of whether the "following the spouse doctrine" applies to
same-sex couples, who do not have the option to marry in Pennsylvania. The
majority sidestepped the issue by holding that, even if the doctrine applied,
Procito's partner did not leave her job for reasons beyond her control. 6 A
dissenting judge disagreed and concluded that excluding same-sex couples
from the benefit of the doctrine violates the guarantee of equal protection of
the law.'

148. Id. at 1160.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 1164; see 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3706 (2008).

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

Kripp, 849 A.2d at 1162, 1164.
Id. at 1165.
43 PA. STAT. § 802(b) (2008).
Procito v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Review, 945 A.2d 261, 264 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2008).
Id. at 263.
Id. at 266-67.
Id. at 274 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
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C. Same-Sex Felons
Steven Roberts and Daniel Mangini were in a committed relationship for
eighteen years.' 58 They were arrested for, and pleaded guilty to, trafficking in
methamphetamines.' 59 As a condition of their release, they were each
prohibited from associating with convicted felons (including each other). 6 0
They asked to have that condition waived by their probation officer, but that
request was denied.' 6
In United States v. Roberts, the court held that this condition must be
modified to allow them to associate with each other.'62 In reaching its
decision,'63 the court relied upon both the relevant provisions of federal
criminal law and the couple's rights to intimate association and equal
protection of the law under the 5th Amendment's Due Process Clause, as
interpreted by the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas. 6"
CONCLUSION

The legal landscape for lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and transgender
individuals across the country seems to be in perpetual motion. The situation
is no different in Pennsylvania. In this Article, I have provided a snapshot of
the current legal landscape in Pennsylvania for same-sex couples. In some
areas, same-sex couples have benefited from helpful legal developments. In
other areas, the legal developments have been less than salutary. Overall, this
snapshot demonstrates that Pennsylvania same-sex couples-like same-sex
couples in many other parts of the country-continue to face significant
obstacles and uncertainties in obtaining even a measure of legal recognition
for their relationships.

158. United States v. Roberts, Nos. 04-00037-1 & -2, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55950, at *4 (E.D. Pa.
July 31, 2007).
159. Id. at *3.
160. Id. at *4.
161. Id. at *6.
162. Id. at *"16-17.
163. Id. at*18-32.
164. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).

